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I. INTRODUCTION 
John Stuart Mill offers arguably the most insightful and important 
defense of free speech. He contends that freedom of speech will 
contribute to “the permanent interest of man as a progressive being.”1 
Freedom of speech is often justified based on the idea that an 
undisturbed marketplace of ideas is an essential ingredient to a healthy 
democracy.2 Indeed, the Supreme Court has declared this the primary 
purpose of the First Amendment: “to preserve an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”3 This is a 
strong defense, but it does not go far enough. Mill does us a great 
service when he reminds us that we are fallible beings.4 He reasons 
that although we may be confident a view is incorrect, it alone is no 
basis to silence that view.5 He reasoned that any silenced opinion 
could be true, and to deny this is to assume one’s infallibility.6 In 
addition, Mill provides that although a silenced opinion could be 
incorrect, it “may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of the 
truth . . . .”7  
Much ink has been spilled over the importance of freedom of 
speech, but Mill’s positions are particularly insightful additions. And 
there are many more reasons to defend freedom of speech—one of 
                                                 
1.  Michael Lacewing, Mill on Freedom of Thought and Expression, ROUTLEDGE: 
TAYLOR & FRANCIS GROUP 1, 1 http://documents.routledge-
interactive.s3.amazonaws.com/9781138793934/A2/Mill/MillTruth.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2LUD-4WW4]. 
2.  Brian Miller, There's No Need to Compel Speech. The Marketplace of Ideas Is 
Working, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/briankmiller/2017/12/04/theres-no-need-to-compel-
speech-the-marketplace-of-ideas-is-working/#674806914e68 
[https://perma.cc/VXP4-ZXEY]. For a highly critical discussion of the analogy of 
the marketplace of ideas, see Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace of 
Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 951 (1997). 
3.  Jacquelyn E. Fradette, Online Terms of Service: A Shield for First Amendment 
Scrutiny of Government Action, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 947, 948 (2013) (quoting 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)). 
4.  Lacewing, supra note 1, at 1.  
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. (quoting Mill: “the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is 
that it is robbing the human race . . . If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great 
a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by its 
collision with error”). 
7.  Id. at 2. 
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which is that viewpoint diversity helps us get a clearer view of the 
truth.8 Regardless of the many reasons why free speech should be 
protected, important changes to the way we exchange ideas, driven by 
the invention and proliferation of social media, are challenging the 
law’s ability to safeguard free speech and the marketplace of ideas. 
The way in which we exercise the right to free speech and engage 
with others in the marketplace of ideas has fundamentally changed.9 
Freely expressing one’s views on important social and political 
matters evokes the traditional image of “a person standing on a soap 
box in the town square speaking her mind into a megaphone with 
Congress restrained by the text of the First Amendment and unable to 
interfere.”10  Now, with an internet connection and a social media 
account, “any person . . . can become a town crier with a voice that 
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.” 11  Some have 
compared the significance of this transformation to the magnificent 
changes that came with the introduction of the printing press in 
Europe.12  
The First Amendment is based on the premise that the government 
is the primary threat to free speech and, absent government 
censorship, the marketplace of ideas exists in a healthy and 
undisturbed state.13 But that premise may no longer be reliable in light 
of the increasing popularity of private social media companies. 14 
Today, people increasingly use social media platforms like Facebook, 
                                                 
8 . See Nathan Honeycutt, Political Intolerance Among University Faculty 
Highlights Need for Viewpoint Diversity, 
FORBES (Nov. 21, 2016 12:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin 
/2016/11/21/ political-intolerance-among-university-faculty-highlights-need-for-
viewpoint-diversity/#771f348514b5 [https://perma.cc/96NR-URD3]. 
9.  See generally Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in 2018, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR.: INTERNET & TECHN. (Mar. 1, 2018), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-media-use-in-2018/ 
[https://perma.cc/92JU-XEXP].  
10.  Fradette, supra note 3, at 948. 
11.  Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
12.  Jordan Peterson, YouTube is the Modern Day Gutenberg Press, YOUTUBE 
(Dec 7, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nALQe3L9Os 
[https://perma.cc/4CMF-ZALC]. 
13.  Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. 
COLUM. U. (Sept. 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-
amendment-obsolete [https://perma.cc/4S9R-XWQ7]. 
14.  See id. 
 
3
Patty: Social Media and Censorship
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
102 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. [40 
 
YouTube, and Twitter to discuss social and political matters.15 Nearly 
two-thirds of American adults (65%) use these sites, an increase of 
fifty-eight percent since 2005.16 Ninety percent of young adults age 
eighteen to twenty-nine use social media, and this is up from twelve 
percent in 2005.17 The clear trend is that speech is increasingly taking 
place on private social media platforms that have wide latitude to 
censor content under the contractual relationship they establish with 
their users.18  
The movement of speech onto private platforms is concerning; 
some scholars wonder if this trend is making the First Amendment 
obsolete.19  The reason why is because the First Amendment only 
protects against speech restrictions imposed by state actors; 
infringements on one’s speech by private actors are generally not 
protected by the constitution.20 Because social media companies are 
private actors, any censorship suits against those companies would not 
survive the threshold requirement of state action.21 Thus, any dispute 
would be resolved by contract which could either limit (or extend) 
additional First Amendment protections to users.22 
This article will attempt to meaningfully advance the scholarship 
addressing the relationship between social media companies, the state 
action doctrine, and the First Amendment. It will argue that, despite 
numerous allegations of censorship and calls for judicial intervention, 
it is unlikely that federal courts will consider social media companies 
state actors despite their increasing influence and importance. But it 
will also argue that it is increasingly likely that a court could conclude 
that a social media company is a state actor in light of recent trends 
                                                 
15.  Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, The Political Environment on Social Media, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (Oct. 25, 2016), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/25/the-political-environment-on-social-
media/ [https://perma.cc/RF2T-VQX7]. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id.  
19.  Wu, supra note 13 (“[T]he main point of this paper . . . is to demonstrate that 
a range of speech control techniques [have] arisen from which the First Amendment, 
at present, provides little or no protection.”). 
20.  Julie K. Brown, Less Is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 MO. 
L. REV. 561, 561 (2008). 
21.  See id. 
22.  See Fradette, supra note 3, at 948. 
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and desires to impose regulations on these companies.23 Further, it 
will argue that if courts continue to conclude that social media 
companies are not state actors, it may be time to once again rethink 
our state action jurisprudence and whether we should tolerate 
infringements on speech just because they are committed by private 
actors.24 
Further, anticipating the possibility that a court could conclude 
that a social media company is a state actor, this article will explore 
the appropriate First Amendment scrutiny that ought to be applied to 
censorship on social media platforms, arguing that intermediate 
scrutiny is most appropriate. It will conclude by echoing recent 
scholarship which suggests that the First Amendment may becoming 
increasingly obsolete in light of the movement of speech into private 
realms outside the scope of constitutional protection25, and why this 
should both give us pause and force us to contemplate solutions. 
Part I will explore in more detail the changing landscape of 
political and social discussion, how social media companies regulate 
speech, and increasing allegations of censorship on social media 
platforms. Part II will discuss the state action doctrine26, its purpose, 
history, and exceptions. Part III will introduce the First Amendment, 
the different levels of scrutiny courts apply in First Amendment cases, 
and why intermediate scrutiny is the most appropriate tier to apply to 
alleged censorship on social media platforms. 
II. SOCIAL MEDIAL PLATFORMS AND CENSORSHIP CONCERNS 
A.  The Changing Landscape of Political and Social Discussion 
It goes without saying that the way people talk about politics and 
current events has radically changed. People today are increasingly 
engaging in political speech online.27 Social network sites now enjoy 
traffic of hundreds of millions of viewers; around 800 million users 
                                                 
23.  Benjamin F. Jackson, Censorship and Freedom of Expression in the Age of 
Facebook, 44 N.M. L. REV. 121, 127 (2014). 
24.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 507 
(1985). 
25.  See Wu, supra note 13. 
26.  I would like to thank Benjamin F. Jackson for his article’s contribution and 
generation of the idea for this article.  
27.  See Duggan & Smith, supra note 15. 
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visit Facebook28 daily.29 In a given week, millennials generally look 
to social media platforms for their sources of political news.30 About 
half of Generation X reported receiving news on Facebook in a given 
week. 31  During the 2016 presidential election, about one-third of 
eighteen to twenty-nine-year-old Americans listed social media as the 
most helpful source for informing them about the election.32 
Political candidates have also taken advantage of the low cost of 
advertising to promote their policies and candidacies on social media 
sites like YouTube.33 Since April 2015, voters have watched more 
than 110 million hours of such content on YouTube.34 After popular 
current events occur, the time Americans spend watching videos 
online related to these events greatly increases, and candidates attempt 
to provide video content to educate voters about their positions on the 
topics.35  
Content creators on YouTube hold tremendous sway over the 
opinions of the users who frequent their channels.36 More than half of 
YouTube users between the ages of eighteen and forty-nine comment 
that their political opinions are influenced by YouTube creators.37 
Politicians have associated their political campaigns with these 
                                                 
28.  See Ellen P. Goodman & Julia Powles, Facebook and Google: Most Powerful 
and Secretive Empires We've Ever Known, THE GUARDIAN, (Sept. 28, 2016 3:00 
EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/28/google-facebook-
powerful-secretive-empire-transparency [https://perma.cc/69VF-MKFC]. 
29.  See Duggan & Smith, supra note 15. 
30.  Amy Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried, & Katerina Eva Matsa, Millenials and 
Political News, PEW RESEARCH CTR.: JOURNALISM & MEDIA (June 1, 2015), 
http://www.journalism.org/2015/06/01/millennials-political-news/ 
[https://perma.cc/45WR-BM4U]. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Jeffrey Gottfried, Michael Barthel, Elisa Shearer & Amy Mitchell, The 2016 
Presidential Campaign-a News Event That’s Hard to Miss, PEW RESEARCH CTR.: 
JOURNALISM & MEDIA (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/02/04/the-
2016-presidential-campaign-a-news-event-thats-hard-to-miss/ 
[https://perma.cc/V35U-4AMH]. 
33.  Kate Stanford, How Political Ads and Video Content Influence Voter Opinion, 
THINK WITH GOOGLE (Mar. 2016), https://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/marketing-
resources/content-marketing/political-ads-video-content-influence-voter-opinion/ 
[https://perma.cc/88ET-R7J3]. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Id.  
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. 
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content creators to try to gain influence over their followers. 38 
YouTube also serves as a key forum for political dialogue and debate 
of important issues because social media platforms provide a low cost 
and easy means for people to express their opinions.39  
Multiple United States Supreme Court justices have also 
recognized the importance of this emerging trend of speech taking 
place on social networking websites. 40  During oral argument in 
Packingham v. North Carolina, Justice Anthony Kennedy, speaking 
of Twitter and Facebook, noted that “[t]heir utility and the extent of 
their coverage are greater than the communication you could have 
ever had, even in the paradigm of public square.”41 Justice Kagan 
agreed, responding that: “[t]the president now uses Twitter . . . 
everybody uses Twitter. . . [a]ll 50 governors, all 100 senators, every 
member of the House has a Twitter account. So this has become a . . . 
crucially important channel of political communication.” 42  Justice 
Ginsburg said that it is dangerous to restrict access to social media 
because “these people are being cut off from a very large part of the 
marketplace of ideas. And the First Amendment includes not only the 
right to speak, but the right to receive information.”43 Justice Kagan 
agreed:  
Whether it's political community, whether it's religious community . . . 
these sites have become embedded in our culture as ways to 
communicate and ways to exercise our constitutional rights. How many 
people under 30 do you think don't use these sites to get all their 
information? Under 35? I mean, increasingly, this is the way people get 
everything, all information.44 
Such responses indicate the openness of our highest court to the notion 
that speech on these platforms is increasingly important and worthy 
of protection. 
                                                 
38.  Stanford, supra note 33. 
39.  Id. 
40.  See Mark Grabowski, Opinion: Twitter’s Censorship May Be Unconsti-
tutional, WASHINGTON EXAMINER (Mar. 14, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/twitters-censorship-may-be-
unconstitutional/article/2617261 [https://perma.cc/E2UW-Y3L3]. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id. 
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B.  How is Content Regulated by Social Media Companies? 
Confronted with so much speech and political content, social 
media companies use a variety of mechanisms to regulate their 
traffic.45 On YouTube46, one way that content can be restricted or 
limited is through its “Restricted Mode” feature.47 This feature is an 
optional setting that is, according to YouTube, used by “a small subset 
of users, such as libraries, schools, and public institutions, who choose 
to have a more limited viewing experience on YouTube.” 48  The 
default Restricted Mode setting is off.49 But if a user turns it on, 
YouTube uses a rating system that categorizes videos based on their 
content.50 YouTube first uses an algorithm that automatically assesses 
every video based on varying “signals,” including the title, metadata, 
and language in the video so YouTube can comb through a massive 
amount of content and assign ratings to that content. 51  Human 
reviewers sometimes review videos and assign ratings under different 
criteria, including “context, tone, and focus” to determine how to rate 
the content.52 YouTube concedes that with the amount of content the 
algorithm reviews, the system is imperfect.53 An additional trigger for 
human review occurs when a user “flags” a video as “potentially 
inappropriate” 54  Further, if a user believes their video has been 
improperly categorized and made unavailable in restricted mode, they 
may appeal which also triggers manual review.55 
                                                 
45.  See generally Jeffrey Rosen, The Delete Squad: Google, Twitter, Facebook 
and the new global battle over the future of free speech, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 28, 
2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/113045/free-speech-internet-silicon-valley-
making-rules [https://perma.cc/NCV3-2NYA]. 
46.  Although there are numerous social media platforms, this section will focus 
on the practices of YouTube and Facebook. 
47.  Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at *4, 
Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) No. 17-CV-06064-LHK, 
2018 WL 105688. 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. at *5. 
51.  Id.  
52.  Id. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Id.  
55.  Id.  
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Facebook regulates content through a complicated system with 
multiple levels of protection.56 Facebook provides staffers in a variety 
of locations around the world with a rulebook that gives guidance to 
assist with interpretation of Facebook’s community standards to make 
initial censorship decisions. 57  Content reviewers are estimated to 
review several thousand posts a day per person.58 While many of the 
decisions to censor content are straightforward59, a significant amount 
of the decisions involve discretion.60 In harder cases, much like the 
law, the community guidelines don’t offer much guidance as to how 
the speech or content should be treated.61  Next, if certain content 
continues to receive more complaints, regional managers act as a mid-
level appellate court, and if the controversy surrounding the content 
continues to grow, top U.S. executives can step in to make the 
decision. 62  Interestingly, Facebook employees have expressed 
concern for how Facebook handles controversial content, but they 
declined to be named for fear of job repercussions.63 Undoubtedly, the 
practice of regulating content on these platforms is daunting. While 
certainly not exhaustive, the above mechanisms are illustrative of the 
processes in place to regulate content on social medial platforms. 
C.  Allegations of Censorship and Political Bias on Social Media 
Platforms 
On the whole, social media companies have expressed their 
commitment to the open exchange of diverse points of view.64 But, 
                                                 
56.  See Kristina Cooke, Dan Levine, Dustin Volz, Facebook Executives Feel the 




57.  Id. 
58.  Aarti Shahani, From Hate Speech to Fake News: The Content Crisis Facing 




59.  Id. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Shahani, supra note 58. 
64.  See Jackson, supra note 23, at 127. 
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they also have competing interests which create pressure to censor 
content.65  In the wake of WikiLeaks’ release of classified United 
States information, the Department of Justice was able to force 
Twitter to provide information about WikiLeaks accounts.66 Senator 
Joe Lieberman attempted to persuade Twitter to block pro-Taliban 
accounts and speech.67 Further, YouTube was faced with pressure 
from several politicians in the United States and abroad to block many 
videos that promoted terrorism.68 Social media companies also face 
pressures to prevent criminals from targeting victims, accusers, or 
witnesses, or to prevent harassment and intimidation.69 There are also 
strong economic pressures related to preserving relationships with 
advertisers who place their ads on users’ videos.70 While scholars 
have addressed these internal and external pressures that encourage 
censorship, less attention has been paid to the possibility that 
censorship may be caused by the political bias of those who regulate 
content on the platforms themselves.71 This contention has gained 
considerable traction in the preceding months, particularly among 
those on the political right.72 These allegations were brought into the 
national spotlight in Mark Zuckerberg’s recent testimony when 
Senator Ted Cruz questioned Mr. Zuckerberg about political bias on 
his platform.73  
While both conservative and liberal speech has been subject to 
censorship on both Facebook and YouTube, outrage surrounding this 
censorship has been most pronounced on the right.74 Most salient is a 
                                                 
65.  Id. 
66.  Id. at 128–29. 
67.  Id. at 129. 
68.  Id.  
69.  Id. at 129–30. 
70.  Daisuke Wakabayashi & Sapna Maheshwari, YouTube Advertiser Exodus 
Highlights Perils of Online Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/business/media/youtube-advertisers-
offensive-content.html [https://perma.cc/4ZKB-KBSC]. 
71.  See Jackson, supra note 23, at 131 (briefly addressing politically motivated 
reasons for censorship on social media platforms). 
72.  Blair Guild, Sen. Ted Cruz Grills Mark Zuckerberg about Facebook Political 
Bias, CBS NEWS (Apr. 10, 2018, 7:12 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sen-
ted-cruz-grills-mark-zuckerberg-facebook-political-bias/ [https://perma.cc/R8KJ-
9YZQ]. 
73.  Id. 
74.  See id.  
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recent dispute between YouTube and Prager University. 75  Prager 
University was created by the prominent conservative figure Dennis 
Prager devoted to, among other things, “promote what is true, what is 
good, what is excellent, and what is noble through digital media.”76 
The site reports that they have received over two billion views on 
YouTube and Facebook, combined. 77  Prager University filed a 
lawsuit in the Northern District of California alleging that around 
three dozen of their YouTube videos were restricted due to the 
conservative viewpoints they espoused.78 YouTube again found itself 
in the spotlight over decisions to censor certain content when, 
following the Parkland shooting, YouTube introduced increased 
restrictions on videos that involve firearms. 79  YouTube will now 
restrict videos that promote or link to websites that sell guns and other 
accessories.80 It will also restrict videos that contain instructions on 
how to assemble guns.81 In addition, conspiracy theorist Alex Jones 
was recently banned from several social media companies’ platforms, 
including YouTube.82 
These allegations of censorship and political bias have also been 
levied at Twitter. In 2015, the former CEO of Twitter was alleged to 
have taken measures to prevent speech critical of President Obama 
during a Q&A session from spreading on Twitter.83 It was specifically 
                                                 
75.  See infra, section III.B.1 (discussing this litigation in detail). 
76.  About Us, PRAGERU, https://www.prageru.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/82 
PQ-WWJ2]. 
77.  PRAGERU, https://www.prageru.com [https://perma.cc/CF7R-BDBN]. 
78.  Ian Lovett & Jack Nicas, PragerU Sues YouTube in Free-Speech Case, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 23, 2017, 10:24 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/prageru-sues-youtube-in-free-speech-case-
1508811856 [https://perma.cc/F3HF-DZMB]. 
79.  Niraj Chokshi, YouTube to Ban Videos Promoting Gun Sales, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/business/youtube-gun-
ban.html [https://perma.cc/XZQ9-8UWZ]. 
80.  Id.  
81.  Id.  
82 . April Glaser, Apple Banned Alex Jones and Infowars, and Spotify and 
Facebook Followed Suit, SLATE (Aug 06, 2018, 9:32 AM), 
https://slate.com/technology/2018/08/apple-and-spotify-are-now-both-blocking-
infowars-and-alex-jones-podcasts.html [https://perma.cc/RXH7-F2M7]. 
83 .  Rudy Takala, Report: Twitter Censored Messages Critical of Obama, 
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alleged that the former CEO ordered that his employees create an 
algorithm that would suppress critical speech and if any such speech 
was missed by the algorithm, employees would manually censor it.84 
Twitter also came under fire for banning Breitbart News editor Milo 
Yiannopoulos, and appearing to remove “DNC leaks” from Twitter’s 
“trending news” section while it was gaining popularity among 
users.85 More recently the CEO of Twitter came under fire for his post 
on Twitter that signaled his agreement with an article that, among 
other things, declared that “there is no bipartisan way forward” and 
that the United States has two irreconcilable worldviews “that must 
be resolved in short order.”86 Some have argued that this article’s 
main contention is that the Republican party needs to be severely 
marginalized in order for the United States to move forward and solve 
its major problems.87 
Conservative groups are not the only groups claiming censorship 
on social media platforms. In 2016, a coalition of more than seventy 
civil rights groups asked Facebook to provide additional clarification 
regarding its polices for censoring content. 88  They alleged that 
Facebook consistently removed posts that documented human rights 
violations and sometimes the removal was initiated by police 
request.89 The groups pointed to several examples: “the deactivation 
of Korryn Gaines’ account during a standoff with police, the 
suspension of live footage from the Dakota Access pipeline protests, 
the removal of historic photographs such as ‘napalm girl’, the 
disabling of Palestinian journalists’ accounts and reports of Black 
Lives Matter activists’ content being removed.”90  In addition, the 
LGBTQ community expressed concern that YouTube was hiding 
content created by members of their community under their Restricted 
                                                 
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. 
86.  Teri Webster, Twitter CEO Sparks Controversy by Praising Article Sugg-
esting Dems Start ‘Civil War’, THE BLAZE (Apr. 8, 2018 12:19 PM), 
https://www.theblaze.com/news/2018/04/08/twitter-ceo-sparks-controversy-by-
praising-article-suggesting-dems-start-civil-war [https://perma.cc/7HQD-44EF]. 
87.  Id. 
88.  Olivia Solon, Civil Rights Groups: Facebook Should Protect, Not Censor, 
Human Rights Issues, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 31, 2016, 3:54 EDT), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/31/facebook-human-rights-
censorship-civil-rights-mark-zuckerberg-aclu [https://perma.cc/VU4G-25M3]. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. 
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Mode. Users reported that videos containing the words “‘gay,’ 
‘lesbian,’ and ‘bisexual’” were hidden.91 
There are three reasons why any allegations of censorship on 
social media should raise serious concerns. First, the power of social 
media companies is truly remarkable. Facebook, for example, 
exceeded 500 billion in market capitalization in late 201792 and at that 
time had more than two billion active users.93 This represents a major 
concentration of power and control over a significant amount of 
speech. 
Second, it is reasonable to conclude that many of the executives 
and employees responsible for regulating content on these platforms 
are politically liberal.94 A recent Stanford study reported in the New 
York Times found that young Silicon Valley technology 
entrepreneurs are within the range of the most left-leaning 
Democrats.95 This liberalism is reflected in the values and policies 
that govern these companies and this was illustrated in the recent 
firing of the Google engineer James Damore.96 Google fired Damore 
because they had concluded he promoted harmful gender stereotypes 
when he authored a paper that criticized what he believed to be 
“Google’s ideological echo chamber.”97 
                                                 
91.  Libby Watson, YouTube’s Restricted Mode is Hiding Some LGBT Content 
[Update], GIZMODO (Mar. 17, 2017, 4:32 PM), https://gizmodo.com/youtubes-
restricted-mode-is-hiding-some-lgbt-content-1793382337 [https://perma.cc/N3CE-
LWJ4]. 
92.  Matt Egan, Facebook and Amazon Hit $500 Billion Milestone, CNN MONEY 
(July 27, 2017, 10:29 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/07/27/investing/facebook-
amazon-500-billion-bezos-zuckerberg/index.html [https://perma.cc/LAS6-9P5A]. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Dylan Matthews, The Vast Majority of Tech Entrepreneurs are Democrats - 
But a Different Kind of Democrat, VOX (Sept. 6, 2017, 1:20 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/6/16260326/tech-entrepreneurs-
survey-politics-liberal-regulation-unions [https://perma.cc/8K7W-FJBS]. 
95.  Farhad Manjoo, Silicon Valley’s Politics: Liberal, With One Big Exception, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/technology/silicon-valley-politics.html 
[https://perma.cc/KD2D-8LVL]. 
96.  See Alain Sherter, James Damore Lawsuit: Fired Engineer Sues Google, CBS 
NEWS (Jan. 8, 2018, 2:50 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/james-damore-
lawsuit-fired-engineer-sues-google/ [https://perma.cc/97EA-VYC7]. 
97.  See id.  
 
13
Patty: Social Media and Censorship
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
112 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. [40 
 
Third, because these platforms are private, their actions are 
generally outside the scope of the constitutional protection. 98 
Concerns surrounding this censorship are warranted because this is 
posed to continue or increase absent any preventive action by the 
companies or the law. To be sure, the increasing attention being paid 
to such censorship can in part be described by “The Streisand 
Effect.”99 Nonetheless, the allegations of censorship warrant serious 
consideration, and the next section will discuss whether social media 
companies can be considered state actors and thus be subject to the 
First Amendment’s protections. 
While there are numerous social media platforms an influencer 
can utilize, the photo-sharing website Instagram is by far the most 
utilized.100 A report from a platform that connects companies with 
influencers found that 99.3 percent of respondent influencers used 
Instagram to share their messages, as compared to Facebook (67.1 
percent), Snapchat (50.8 percent), and Twitter (43.1 percent).101   
Instagram allows users to edit and share photographs and videos 
(also known as “content”).102 When a user adds content it is displayed 
on a user’s profile and other Instagram users who “follow” them are 
able to see the content.103 The main goal is “to share and find only the 
best photos and videos.”104 Each Instagram profile has a “followers” 
and “following” count which allows Instagram users to know who 
they follow, and how many users follow them.105 A profile may be set 
to “public,” where all Instagram users may see the content, or to 
                                                 
98.  Brown, supra note 20, at 563. 
99.  See Charles Arthur, The Streisand Effect: Secrecy in the Digital Age, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2009, 8:05 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/mar/20/streisand-effect-internet-
law [https://perma.cc/TK3P-8KC4] (describing the Streisand Effect as a situation 
where a person attempts to suppress or hide information, and as result, the opposite 
occurs: more attention is drawn to that information).  
100.  Ayaz Nanji, The Most Important Social Media Networks for Influencers, 
MARKETING PROF. (May 16, 2017), 
https://www.marketingprofs.com/charts/2017/32069/the-most-important-social-
network-for-influencers [https://perma.cc/QAT8-2K56]. 
101.  Id. 
102.  See Elise Moreau, What is Instagram, Anyway?, LIFEWIRE (Mar. 26, 2019), 
https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-instagram-3486316 [https://perma.cc/66LQ-
GUN9]. 
103.  See id. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. 
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“private”, where only an Instagram user’s followers can see the 
content.106 
Instagram also has an “explore” tab which allows users to find or 
add followers and to search for interesting accounts to follow.107 
Instagram tailors the recommend content it provides to each 
individual user. 108  Instagram users can also use the search bar to 
search for specific users or hashtags.109 Hashtags are “words or multi-
word phrases preceded by the # symbol . . . .”110 If an Instagram post 
includes hashtags on a public post, then the post will appear on the 
hashtag page.111  
III. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
A.  Principles, History, and Purpose 
Any alleged constitutional violation begins with the threshold 
question of whether the alleged violator’s conduct can be subject to 
the Constitution’s protections.112 This is because the United States 
Constitution only applies to the actions or omissions of state actors, 
and it does not constrain the behavior of private actors. 113  This 
distinction between public and private action is known as the state 
action doctrine.114 Much has been said about the doctrine’s confusing 
and unpredictable nature. 115  Some have described it as 
“dysfunctional” and “a conceptual disaster area”; Justice Black 
described the United States Supreme Court’s state action 
jurisprudence as “a torchless search for a way out of a damp and 
                                                 
106.  Id. 
107.  Moreau, supra note 102. 
108.  Id.  
109.  Id.  
110.  Sandra Grauschopf, What Does ‘Hashtag’ Mean & How Do You Use One 
Correctly?, THE BALANCE EVERYDAY (Sept. 30, 2017), 
https://www.thebalance.com/what-does-hashtag-mean-and-how-do-you-use-one-
892814 [https://perma.cc/87M9-AC9G]. 
111.    How Do I Use Hashtags?, INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram.com/3514606 
21611097 [https://perma.cc/42X3-MBZT]. 
112.  See Brown, supra note 20, at 563. 
113.  John L. Watts, Tyranny by Proxy: State Action and the Private Use of Deadly 
Force, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237, 1239 (2014). 
114.  See Brown, supra note 20, at 561. 
115.  Id. at 562. 
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echoing cave.” 116  On the other hand, some authorities have 
commented that the doctrine is “the most important problem in 
American law.”117 A key point of emphasis regarding this doctrine is 
that although certain conduct that involves “constitutional values”118 
might be restricted by private actors, there is no constitutional 
violation because courts have no power to redress these private 
interferences.119 In case after case, courts have consistently tolerated 
the violation of essentially every value inherent in the constitution on 
the basis that such private infringements 120  are bereft of state 
action. 121  These private infringements are not at all insignificant 
because they can produce the same or additional harm as state 
actors.122 In fact, the increasing flow of wealth and power into the 
hands of private actors increases these concerns because private action 
can be essentially indistinguishable from state action, but only the 
latter is subject to constitutional scrutiny.123  
An often neglected inquiry is why the law should tolerate such 
private infringements simply because they are committed by private 
actors.124 An important starting point to address this question is to 
investigate the beliefs held at the time the Constitution was written.125 
When the Constitution was written, there was widespread belief that 
the common law adequately shielded personal liberties from private 
invasion.126 The reasoning followed that there was no need for the 
Constitution to address what was already given strong protections in 
the common law.127 However, when our national government was 
                                                 
116.  See Brown, supra note 20, at 562. 
117. Kevin L. Cole, Federal and State "State Action"': The Undercritical Emb-
race of a Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327, 327 n.3 (1990). 
118.  Id. at n.2 (defining constitutional values as “the value[s] that a particular 
constitutional provision would promote if the provision were construed as applying 
to both public and private deprivations”). 
119.  See id. 
120.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 507 
(1985) (defining private infringements of constitutional rights as a short-hand for 
actions by private individuals that seem to deny the values that courts protect when 
they apply the constitution). 
121.  Id. at 510 (collecting cases). 
122.  Id. at 511. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Chemerinsky, supra note 120, at 511. 
126.  Id. 
127.  Id. at 512. 
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created, a primary fear was that it wouldn’t be constrained by the 
common law and that it could violate liberties in ways that private 
entities couldn’t. 128  Therefore, the Bill of Rights was added to 
incorporate these preexisting common law protections and require the 
new national government to be constrained by them.129   
When Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, it was still thought that 
the common law provided adequate protection against private 
infringements of rights such as discrimination by restaurants and 
transportation.130 This was the basis of the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in the Civil Rights Cases which held that certain forms of private 
discrimination were not controlled by the Constitution because people 
could seek relief in the common law.131 This is a key point: the case 
that formally announced the state action doctrine assumed that there 
were effective common law protections when it reached its decision 
finding no state action.132 Now, however, there are increasingly no 
common law protections for many rights, including private 
infringements of speech. 133  This would include any such private 
speech infringements committed by social media companies. So why 
should such private infringements be accepted? Maybe they shouldn’t 
be, and regardless of the answer, it is a question worth reconsidering 
given the importance of free expression. Given the increasing power 
of social media companies and the movement of speech online, 
censorship allegations on social media platforms provide a wonderful 
opportunity to once again reexamine the state action doctrine as Dean 
Chemerinsky suggested in 1985.134 
                                                 
128.  Id. 
129. Id. at 513–14 (“For example, the fourth amendment's protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures was identical to the protection that the common-
law actions of trespass and false arrest provided against private invasions of liberty. 
Similarly, the fifth amendment's prohibition against government takings of property 
without just compensation applied common-law principles of conversion to federal 
actions. Basic common-law assurances redressing deprivations of life, liberty, and 
property were applied to the national government via the fifth amendment's due 
process clause. Most dramatically, legal historian Leonard Levy has demonstrated 
that the first amendment's protection of freedom of speech was meant solely to 
incorporate well-established common-law principles.”). 
130.  Id. at 515. 
131.  Chemerinsky, supra note 120, at 515. 
132.  Id. at 516–17 (emphasis added). 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. 
 
17
Patty: Social Media and Censorship
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
116 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. [40 
 
B.  State Action Exceptions 
Setting aside the important history of the doctrine above, there are 
exceptions to the general rule requiring state action, and the Supreme 
Court has handed down several tests to determine when state action is 
present. 135  There are two primary exceptions to the general rule 
discussed above: the public function exception and the entwinement 
exception.136  
1. Public Function Exception 
The “public function” exception provides that a private entity will 
be deemed a state actor if they engage in conduct that is “traditionally 
exclusively reserved to the State.”137  The primary purpose of this 
exception is to prevent private actors such as corporations and 
companies from abusing their power when they have duties and 
powers delegated to them by state actors. 138  The public function 
exception has its origins in Marsh v. Alabama.139 There, a Jehovah’s 
Witness entered a privately-owned town and distributed religious 
information. 140  The managers of the town initiated criminal 
proceedings against him, which led to a trespass conviction.141 The 
Supreme Court reversed and held that the private company town’s 
property rights did not “justify the State's permitting a corporation to 
govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental 
liberties . . . ” and treated the company owned town as a state actor.142 
The Court based its decision on several rationales.143 First, the 
Court reasoned that the town was essentially identical to other towns 
except for the fact that it was privately owned and could undermine 
liberty in the same way that the government could.144 Second, because 
the town and its shopping area were freely accessible to the public, 
                                                 
135.  See Brown, supra note 20, at 564–65. 
136.  Jackson, supra note 90, at 140 (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 
U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (citation omitted)).  
137.  Id. 
138.  Id. 
139.  Id. (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)). 
140.  Id. 
141.  Jackson, supra note 90, at 140. 
142.  Id.  
143.  Id. at 144. 
144.  Id. 
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the town served a public function that was virtually identical to that 
exercised by the state.145 Third, by treating the company town as a 
state actor and subjecting constitutional scrutiny to its actions, the 
value of democratic self-governance would be advanced.146 Each one 
of these rationales supports a finding that social network platforms 
should fall under the public function exception. 147  First, social 
network platforms can inflict much greater injury to free speech than 
the town in Marsh. 148  Second, these platforms are increasingly 
becoming the primary tool by which people engage in the marketplace 
of ideas, and they are also increasingly used by public officials to 
communicate with members of the public. 149  Third, these social 
networking websites are becoming important means for political 
communication and mobilization.150 
Despite the seemingly expansive scope of the language in Marsh, 
the scope of Marsh has been considerably narrowed in later cases.151 
In Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., the Court held that the public 
function exception only “encompasses public functions that are both 
‘traditionally and exclusively’ provided for by the State.” 152 
Therefore, this case stands for the proposition that it is not enough for 
a government to have historically engaged in a particular function; 
privately run organizations must not also engage in the same activity 
in order for state action to be found.153 It has also been argued that 
social networking companies should still be viewed as state actors 
because they are like “public squares and meeting places,” and they 
are arguably the “town squares of the twenty-first century.” 154 
Because managing public squares and meeting places have been 
traditionally managed by the state, social networking websites can be 
considered a public function that was traditionally within the purview 
of the state.155   
                                                 
145.  Id. 
146.  Jackson, supra note 90, at 144. 
147.  Id. 
148.  Id.  
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. 
151.  Jackson, supra note 90, at 145. 
152.  Id. 
153.  Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974) (emphasis added). 
154.  Jackson, supra note 90, at 145. 
155.  Id. 
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Thus far, with respect to private internet companies, courts have 
not been receptive to the argument that they constitute state actors 
under the public function exception.156 The Third Circuit and two 
additional federal courts have rejected157 the argument that America 
Online (“AOL”) is a state actor because AOL “exercises absolutely 
no powers which are in any way the prerogative, let alone the 
exclusive prerogative, of the State,” and AOL is “merely one of many 
private online companies which allow [their] members access to the 
Internet . . . .”158 Further, other federal district courts have rejected 
arguments that Sony’s PlayStation 3 Network is a state actor because 
it “serves solely as a forum for people to interact subject to specific 
contractual terms,” and the network functions mainly for 
entertainment reasons.159 Courts have also rejected the notion that a 
private domain name registrant is a state actor because the internet, as 
well as the registration of domain names on the internet do not come 
close to being “traditional and exclusive public functions.”160  
Recently, a federal court, for the first time, thoroughly analyzed 
whether a social media company is a state actor under the public 
function exception.161 While the court dismissed the complaint with 
leave to amend, it provides a model for how many courts are likely to 
analyze claims that social media companies are state actors under 
Marsh. 
a. Prager University v. Google LLC 
In Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, Plaintiff Prager University filed a 
complaint asserting that YouTube violated their First Amendment 
rights.162 Their principal argument was that while YouTube held itself 
                                                 
156.  Id. at 142. 
157.  Id. at n.104 (citing Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003); 
Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 546 (E.D. Va. 2003) (citing 
Green, 318 F.3d at 472); see also Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 
F. Supp. 436, 437 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
158.  Id. at 143 (quoting Cyber Promotions, 948 F. Supp. at 437). 
159.  Jackson, supra note 90, at 143 (quoting Estavillo v. Sony Computer Entm't 
Am., No. C-09-03007 RMW, 2009 WL 3072887 at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2009). 
160.  Id. n.107 (quoting Island Online, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 119 F. 
Supp. 2d 289, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)). 
161.  Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-06064-LHK, 2018 WL 1471939, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) 
162.  See id.  
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out as a purveyor of viewpoint neutrality, it repeatedly engaged in 
censorship practices that discriminated against Plaintiff because of its 
conservative political views.163 They argued that the censorship took 
the form of placing age restrictions on some of its videos or 
“demonetizing” them, which means to prevent placing ads on their 
videos in a viewpoint discriminatory manner. 164  Importantly, the 
censorship allegations above did not include any claims that its videos 
have been completely removed from YouTube. 165  To support its 
arguments, they placed their videos side-by-side to videos where 
access had been restricted next to other videos that had not been 
restricted, which discussed the same or similar topic but from a liberal 
point of view.166  
Prager University’s key contention was based on an analogy to 
Marsh.167 They argued that YouTube holds itself out “as a public 
forum dedicated to freedom of expression to all” and that “a private 
property owner who operates its property as a public forum for speech 
is subject to judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment.”168 The 
Court rejected this contention, but it also presented language from 
Marsh that appeared supportive of the Plaintiff’s position: “[t]he more 
an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the 
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the 
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”169  
But, according to the Court, subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
have rejected any broad extension of this language in Marsh. As 
support for this proposition, the Court discussed what are referred to 
as the “shopping mall cases.”170 The Court began its discussion of 
these cases, noting that in Logan Valley, the Supreme Court held that 
a privately-owned shopping center was unable to forbid workers from 
protesting a store in a shopping center because such a restriction 
                                                 
163.  Id. 
164.  Id. at *2. 
165.  Id. (emphasis added). 
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. at *6. 
168.  Id. 
169.  Id. 
170 .   See generally Brady C. Williamson & James A. Friedman, State 
Constitutions: The Shopping Mall Cases, WIS. L. REV. 883 (1998). 
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violated their First Amendment rights. 171  The Supreme Court in 
Logan Valley reasoned that the shopping center was open to the public 
in the same way that a commercial center of a town would be, and the 
Supreme Court analogized to Marsh.172 It continued to reason that the 
shopping center was “clearly the functional equivalent of the business 
district of [the privately-owned town] involved in Marsh.”173 
However, the Prager University Court pointed out over the course 
of eight years, the Supreme Court formally overturned its decision in 
Logan Valley and adopted the reasoning of Justice Black’s dissent in 
Logan Valley.174 Justice Black authored the Marsh majority opinion, 
and in his dissent in Logan Valley, he heavily criticized the Logan 
Valley majority for its misunderstanding of Marsh and its appropriate 
scope. Four years after Logan Valley, the Supreme Court in Lloyd 
Corp. v. Tanner held that a private shopping center was within its right 
to forbid anti-Vietnam War protestors from disseminating literature in 
the shopping center because it was not a state actor.175 The Supreme 
Court held that, based on Justice Black’s dissent in Logan Valley, 
Marsh “‘was never intended to apply’” outside “‘the very special 
situation of a company-owned town.’”176 The Court emphasized that 
in Marsh, the privately-owned town assumed the “full spectrum” of 
powers that would traditionally be performed by the State.177  The 
Court then distinguished the shopping center at issue in the case 
reasoning that there was “no comparable assumption or exercise of 
municipal functions or power.”178 
The Prager University Court summarized what it believed was the 
key takeaway from the above cases: that the reach of Marsh is 
limited.179 Consistent with that characterization, the Court rejected the 
notion that Marsh supports YouTube being deemed a state actor 
because of the simple fact that they operate a private forum for 
                                                 
171.  Prager Univ., 2018 WL 1471939 at *6 (citing Amalgamated Food Emp. 
Union Loc. 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968), abrogated 
by Hudgens v. N. L. R. B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976)). 
172.  Id. 
173.  Id. 
174.  Id. at *7. 
175.  Id. (citing Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)). 
176.  Prager Univ., 2018 WL 1471939 at *7 (quoting Lloyd Corp., Ltd., 407 U.S. 
at 562–63). 
177.  Id. 
178.  Id. (quoting Lloyd Corp., Ltd., 407 U.S. at 569). 
179.  Id. at *8. 
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expression of varied perspectives.180 Finally, the Prager University 
Court recognized that while the Supreme Court, in Packingham, 
recognized the increasing importance of social media, it was 
distinguishable because the question of state action was not before the 
Court.181  
In conclusion, the Prager University Court reasoned that 
YouTube appears to not at all be like a private corporation “that 
governs and operates all municipal functions for an entire town, or 
one that has been given control over a previously public sidewalk or 
park, or one that has effectively been delegated the task of holding and 
administering public elections.”182 YouTube and Google, according 
to the Court, are private entities that maintain their own video-sharing 
social media platform, and they are within their right as to how they 
manage content that has been created or uploaded,183 and that this 
conclusion is consistent with other court decisions that have not 
treated social media companies or online service providers as state 
actors.184 
Courts will likely find the reasoning in the Prager University case 
persuasive given the way Marsh has been narrowed by the Supreme 
Court. Thus, despite the increasing importance of social media 
platforms in our discourse, courts will likely not be persuaded by 
arguments that social media platforms should be deemed state actors 
under the public function exception. But recent events, scholarship, 
and statements from social media executives and lawmakers indicate 
that the likelihood of state action may be greater under the 
entwinement exception discussed below. 
2. The Entwinement Exception 
The second primary exception to the state action doctrine is the 
entwinement exception. 185  Under the entwinement exception, a 
private actor may be subject to constitutional scrutiny “because he has 
acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, 
                                                 
180.  Id. 
181.  Prager Univ., 2018 WL 1471939 at *8. 
182.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
183.  Id. (collecting cases). 
184.  Id. (collecting cases). 
185.  Jackson, supra note 23, at 152. 
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or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.”186 The 
key requirement is that there is a “sufficiently close nexus” between 
the government and the challenged action,187 because the purpose of 
the exception is to assure the protections of the constitution are only 
triggered when it can be said that the government is responsible for 
the particular conduct the plaintiff is challenging. 188  Therefore, 
“private conduct must comply with the Constitution if the government 
has authorized, encouraged, or facilitated the unconstitutional 
conduct.” 189  For example, state action will be found under this 
exception if a private party was given the power to manage publicly 
accessible property knowing that the private party will prevent access 
to the property in a manner that violates the constitution. 190 
Importantly, mere government licensing or regulation is not enough 
to establish state action. The same is true for government financial 
support of a nongovernmental party, unless the financial support is 
given to weaken constitutional protections.191 
Some scholars have argued that because the federal government 
was involved in the internet’s creation, and its goal for this was to 
facilitate communication and the exchange of ideas, the federal 
government should be seen as adequately entwined with the internet 
to support the treatment of internet actors as state actors.192 But this 
argument has been criticized by those who support considering social 
media platforms as state actors; they contend it would foreclose a 
finding of state action because the government did not participate in 
the creation of social media companies.193 In addition, it has been 
argued that the approach above would not strike an appropriate 
balance because it would effectively treat all internet actors as state 
actors. 194  Regardless, courts to this point have rejected these 
arguments.195  
                                                 
186.  Id. at n.160 (quoting Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). 
187.  Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). 
188.  Id. 
189 . Jackson, supra note 23, at 152 n.161 (citing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 519–21 (4th ed. 2011)). 
190.  Id.  
191.  Id.  
192.  Id. 
193.  Id. at 153. 
194.  Jackson, supra note 23, at 153. 
195.  Id. at n.167. 
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Courts have also rejected other arguments that social media 
platforms or their parent companies have sufficient relations with the 
government to become sufficiently entwined.196 Federal courts have 
rejected the contention that Facebook is a state actor because of its 
contractual relationship with the government, which allows agencies 
to operate certain pages on Facebook. 197  Courts have similarly 
rejected the argument that Google is sufficiently entwined with the 
government because Google has collaborated with the government to 
create a digital library with state universities.198 Benjamin Jackson 
argues that similar contentions are likely to continue to be 
unsuccessful given the minimal contacts between the government and 
social media companies, and that to date, the websites do not seem to 
have any special relationship with the government warranting a 
finding of state action.199 
However, Jackson recognizes that his contention is currently 
limited to the situation in the United States.200 He presents numerous 
examples of foreign governments being more actively engaged in 
censorship activity by requesting Facebook, for example, to take 
down certain videos or posts.201 Jackson correctly emphasizes the fact 
specific nature of the state action inquiry, and how litigants could 
possibly be successful on an entwinement claim if the right facts 
presented themselves. 202  One scenario he presents is if Facebook 
began censoring content related to WikiLeaks in coordination with 
federal agencies.203 He presents another where entwinement could be 
found if the government and social media platforms engage in a joint 
initiative to protect children from sexual predators.204 Recent trends 
in the United States illustrate that Jackson’s positions could be 
vindicated, and regarding his sexual predator hypothetical, he may 
have a crystal ball. 
Recent events indicate that the U.S. government may elect to take 
a more active role in working with social media companies to censor 
                                                 
196.  Id.  
197.  Id. 
198.  Id. 
199.  Jackson, supra note 23, at n.167. 
200.  Id. 
201.  Id.  
202.  Id.  
203.  Id.  
204.  Jackson, supra note 23, at n.167. 
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content.205 As one example, the U.S. has become more concerned with 
the deleterious effect of unrestrained communication on social media 
platforms, as illustrated by the increasing concerns surrounding “fake 
news” and the U.S. government’s desire to limit its effect on our 
elections.206 When members of Congress held hearings related to the 
dissemination of fake news, multiple members expressed their grave 
concerns related to fake news. 207  Some Democrats explicitly 
threatened to attempt to regulate social media companies if they fail 
to address the different manifestations of fake news. 208  Dianne 
Feinstein, in one hearing with social media executives, remarked, 
“[y]ou have to be the ones to do something about it . . . [o]r we will.”209 
Additional support for the proposition that entwinement may be more 
likely is that recently, some experts have commented that social media 
companies may not be able to tackle the fake news problem on their 
own even if they wanted to.210 This is because they lack the “expertise 
or intelligence or the assets” in their companies211, and it is extremely 
difficult to draw the line between fake news and garden variety 
political punditry.212 Former executives within Facebook have also 
suggested that social media companies ought to do more to solve the 
fake news problem.213 Adam D’Angelo, a former chief technology 
officer at Facebook, commented that it is essential that users are more 
                                                 
205.  Kara Swisher, US Government Should Deal With Fake News Conflict, 
CNBC (Mar. 9, 2018, 7:43 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2018/03/09/us-
government-should-deal-with-fake-news-conflict-kara-swisher.html 
[https://perma.cc/KS7P-CWKV] (presenting the comments of Ash Carter, the 
former Defense Secretary, specifically advocating that tech companies work 
together with the government to reach solutions to fight fake news). 
206.  Darrel M. West, Report: How to Combat Fake News and Disinformation, 
BROOKINGS (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-
fake-news-and-disinformation [https://perma.cc/H2Y8-TSKY]. 
207.  Zach Weissmueller, ‘Fake News’ Is Not an Excuse to Regulate the Internet, 
REASON (Jan. 17, 2018), https://reason.com/archives/2018/01/17/why-fake-news-
is-not-an-excuse-to-regula [https://perma.cc/455R-Q3E6]. 
208.  Id. 
209.  Id. 
210.  Ali Breland, Social Media Fights Back Against Fake News, THE HILL (May 
27, 2017, 11:52 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/335370-social-media-
platforms-take-steps-to-protect-users-from-fake-news/ [https://perma.cc/X6AE-
G78N]. 
211.  Id. 
212.  Id. 
213.  Id. 
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aware of where their news is really coming from, and government 
regulation at some point to address this issue is a “real option.”214 
Therefore, while concrete examples of entwinement between 
social media companies and the government are lacking in the United 
States, it appears that the probability of such a situation is increasing 
as lawmakers, experts, and members of social media companies 
become more concerned about content on social media. 215  The 
government could begin to affirmatively work with these companies 
to censor content and create the entwinement necessary to trigger the 
protections of the First Amendment.216 
Interestingly, a case almost exactly matching Benjamin Jackson’s 
sexual predator hypothetical above came before the Supreme Court in 
2017 in Packingham v. North Carolina.217 There, the state action issue 
was not before the Court; the case involved a North Carolina law that 
prohibited sex offenders from accessing social media platforms.218 
The Court struck the law down and held that it violated the First 
Amendment.219 In that case, there were no facts illustrating that the 
government cooperated with Facebook to enforce the particular law 
against Petitioner. The Petitioner who challenged his conviction under 
that statute was discovered by a law enforcement officer looking for 
violators on his own.220 But in the future, as Jackson points out, one 
could reasonably anticipate that a situation could occur where the 
enforcement of a similar law would require Facebook sharing 
information of potential violators with authorities. 221  Due to the 
highly fact-specific nature of the state action doctrine and its 
exceptions, a finding of state action through the entwinement 
exception is clearly an uphill battle, but it is one that appears to be 
increasingly likely.222 
                                                 
214.  Matthew Ingram, Former Facebook Exec Says Government Action on Fake 
News Is a Real Possibility, FORTUNE (Apr. 25, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/04/25/facebook-government-fake-news/ 
[https://perma.cc/KXD6-B4VR]. 
215.  See Jackson, supra note 23, at 154. 
216.  See id. 
217.  Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
218.  Id. 
219.  Id. 
220.  Brief for Petitioner at 6, Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 
1734 (2017) (No. 15–1194). 
221.  See Jackson, supra note 23, at 154. 
222.  See Chemerinsky, supra note 120, at 511. 
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But concluding that social media companies are not state actors is 
another example of how the doctrine tolerates significant private 
infringements to go unchecked.223 In addition, the doctrine developed 
based on the premise that infringements by private actors were 
adequately protected by the common law.224 But as more individual 
rights were created, many were left unprotected,225 and the same is 
true with respect to social media companies; no such protections exist 
for claims of censorship by social media companies in the common 
law. Such a reality should give us pause to consider the utility of the 
state action doctrine along with how we can effectively promote 
freedom of expression on social media platforms. 
To be sure, there are some strong reasons why treating social 
media companies as state actors would be problematic. 226  While 
social media platforms play an increasingly influential and important 
role in our national conversation, one could argue that degree of 
influence should not be the test for state action.227 If this were the test, 
every employer would be a state actor, and possibly every family, 
which may allow the exceptions to swallow the rule.228 Treating these 
companies as state actors would also hamstring their ability to respond 
to many other problems such as “trolling, flooding, [and] abuse . . . 
.”229  
But without legal recourse under the First Amendment, there is no 
guarantee that individual instances or patterns of censorship will be 
adequately addressed. Disputes will be resolved under the contractual 
relationships established by social media companies who are free to 
limit (or extend) the scope of expression in comparison to the First 
Amendment or discriminate based on viewpoint. 230  This is 
particularly troubling if such claims of censorship continue or 
increase, especially if the claims involve viewpoint discrimination, 
and it warrants an important conversation about how to ensure private 
companies commit to free expression on their platforms.  
Thus, while unlikely, it is possible that a court could find that a 
social media company is a state actor and disagree with the reasoning 
                                                 
223.  See id.  
224.  Id. at 511–12. 
225.  See id. at 511–16. 
226.  See Wu, supra note 13. 
227.  See id. 
228.  See id. 
229.  Id. 
230.  See Fradette, supra note 3, at 948. 
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in Prager University, for example, or find state action under the 
entwinement exception. The next section will address the appropriate 
level of First Amendment scrutiny a court should apply if they were 
to consider social media companies state actors. 
C.  The First Amendment 
The free speech clause of the First Amendment provides that 
Congress “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”231 
The history of the First Amendment is as interesting as it is 
surprising.232 For most of American history, the First Amendment 
remained dormant, even well into the 1920s.233 It finally came to life 
when the government began controlling speech during the First World 
War by levying criminal charges on those who were opposed to the 
war.234 Initially, federal courts and the Supreme Court were silent in 
response to this strong censorship.235 This trend changed only after 
Judge Hand and others began articulating the foundation for the 
modern First Amendment. 236  First Amendment jurisprudence has 
been characterized as “sprawling”237 and highly fact-specific.238 This 
characterization has raised concerns that judicial activism is being 
promoted, and that there is a lack of guidance for lower courts and 
practitioners.239  
                                                 
231.  U.S. CONST. amend I. 
232.  See Wu, supra note 13. 
233.  Id. 
234.  Id. 
235.  Id. 
236.  Id. at n.17 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
237.  Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable 
Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (2011). 
238.  The fact-specific nature has been stated both as a general observation and as 
a criticism of the doctrine. Compare The Honorable John Paul Stevens, The 
Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1300 (1993) (presenting the fact-specific 
nature of first amendment jurisprudence neutrally), with Mike Rappaport, Justice 
Thomas on the Tiers of Scrutiny, LAW & LIBERTY (Aug. 12, 2016), 
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2016/08/12/justice-thomas-on-the-tiers-of-scrutiny 
[https://perma.cc/CU5S-WH7T] (presenting Justice Thomas’s views that fact-
specific nature is better characterized as inconsistency that is undesirable). 
239.  Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial 
Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 299 (1998). 
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1. The First Amendment: Tiers of Scrutiny 
First Amendment free speech doctrine is incredibly formalistic.240 
It “aggressively subdivides the known world into endless categories 
and describes distinctive rules and tests to evaluate the 
constitutionality of regulations that fall within those categories.”241 
Under a First Amendment speech analysis, the first step is to place 
the speech regulation into its proper category.242 There are two main 
categories: content-neutral laws and content-based laws. 243 
Distinguishing between these two categories is no easy task, and how 
the speech regulation is characterized is frequently outcome-
determinative.244 After a speech regulation is categorized, it will be 
subject to the standard of scrutiny that has been determined for that 
particular category.245 There are three different levels of scrutiny that 
can apply to a particular speech regulation: “rational basis review, 
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.”246  
Rational basis review is the lowest standard of review; it is highly 
deferential, and the default standard that courts apply.247 This review 
carries a presumption that the law is constitutional.248 It demands that 
the challenged regulation be “rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest.”249 Given this highly deferential standard, this 
level of scrutiny provides almost no problem for regulations that 
impinge on speech.250 
                                                 
240.  See Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
1981, 1982 (2016). 
241.  Id. 
242.  See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, § 
3:1 (2018). 
243.  Erika Schutzman, We Need Professional Help: Advocating for A Consistent 
Standard of Review When Regulations of Professional Speech Implicate the First 
Amendment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 2019, 2028 (2015). 
244 .  See SMOLLA, supra note 242, at § 3.1; Erwin Chemerinsky, Content 
Neutrality As A Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme 
Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 53–54 (2000).  
245.  Schutzman, supra note 243, at 2026.  
246.  Id. 
247.  Id. 
248.  David T. Hardy, The Right to Arms and Standards of Review: A Tale of 
Three Circuits, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (2014). 
249.  Schutzman, supra note 243, at 2026 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Cir., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).  
250.  See Schutzman, supra note 243, at 2026. 
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Intermediate scrutiny is the second most stringent form of review; 
it requires that a “regulation directly advance[] a substantial 
government interest and that the regulation is not more extensive than 
necessary to serve that interest.”251 Courts apply this level of scrutiny 
to content-neutral regulations as well as several other types of 
regulations.252 This level of review is one of the Supreme Court’s 
most commonly utilized balancing methods.253 Unlike rational basis 
review, which arguably acts as a rubber stamp for regulations that 
burden speech, and strict scrutiny, which often is deadly rather than 
strict,254 intermediate scrutiny demands that a court compare opposing 
interests and is not nearly as outcome-determinative.255 Given that at 
its core it is a balancing test, it has received significant criticism from 
judges and scholars who charge that it is both unpredictable and that 
it incentivizes judicial activism.256 It has also been characterized as 
“malleable, uncertain, highly flexible, unpredictable, contrived, 
inconsistent, and inadequate.”257 The test has also been manipulated 
by the Supreme Court.258 In several cases, the Court has applied the 
test to regulations that are normally subject to strict scrutiny, or altered 
the application of the intermediate scrutiny standard to effectively 
require a justification that is between intermediate and strict 
scrutiny.259 As a result, dissenting justices have criticized this scrutiny 
as a violation of stare decisis.260 
Strict scrutiny offers the utmost protection to speech under the 
First Amendment.261 Under this standard of review, courts uphold 
                                                 
251.  See id. at 2026–27. 
252.  See id. at 2027; Wexler, supra note 239, at 301, n.15 (listing the different 
applications of intermediate scrutiny). 
253.  Wexler, supra note 239, at 300.  
254.  Id. at n.16 (quoting Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on A Changing Court: A Model for A Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)). But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An 
Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 
812 (2006) (providing an empirical analysis to disprove the widespread assertion 
that when strict scrutiny applies, laws are almost always struck down). 
255.  Wexler, supra note 239, at 300. 
256.  Id. at 300–01. 
257.  Id. at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
258.  Id. 
259.  Id. at 301–02. 
260.  Wexler, supra note 239, at 303. 
261.  Schutzman, supra note 243, at 2027. 
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regulations only if they “further[] a compelling interest and [are] 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”262  
2. Speech Regulated Under Content-Neutral Laws 
There are two major categories that speech is placed into, and each 
has its own level of scrutiny.263 Content-neutral laws, as their label 
suggests, apply to speech regardless of the particular subject matter or 
content conveyed; they “regulate the time, place, or manner of 
expression.”264  These regulations are subject to a less demanding 
review, and as a consequence, they are upheld more frequently.265 
Content-neutral laws are commonly perceived as less threatening to 
free expression given that they don’t target specific content; however, 
many courts have taken a contrary view, recognizing that content-
neutral laws can actually burden more speech than certain content 
based laws.266 If a speech regulation is deemed content-neutral, it will 
survive if it passes intermediate scrutiny.267   
The first step in the content-neutrality inquiry is determining 
whether the regulation is content-neutral on its face.268 If it is, then the 
court should a consider whether the purpose behind enacting the law 
is content-neutral or content-based.269 Therefore, before concluding 
that a law is content-neutral, a court must engage in a two-step inquiry: 
first, evaluate the face of the regulation, and then its purpose.270 
3. Speech Regulated Under Content-Based Laws 
On the contrary, content-based regulations are presumed to be 
unconstitutional and are subject to strict scrutiny.271 To survive strict 
scrutiny, the government must prove that the law is “narrowly tailored 
to serve compelling state interests.”272 There are several means by 
                                                 
262.  Id. at 2027 (internal quotations omitted). 
263.  See SMOLLA, supra note 242, at § 3.1. 
264.  See id. § 3.2, n.5. 
265.  See id. § 3.1. 
266.  See id. 
267.  See id.; see also Schutzman, supra note 243, at 2027. 
268.  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015). 
269.  Id. 
270.  Id. 
271.  See id. at 2226. 
272.  Id. 
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which a speech regulation can be deemed content-based: (1) if the 
speech is targeted “based on its communicative content”; (2) if the 
regulation “applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed 
or the idea or message expressed”; (3) if the regulation cannot be 
supported “without reference to the content of the regulated speech”; 
or (4) that were passed “because of disagreement with the message 
conveyed.”273 Many scholars argue that the purpose of distinguishing 
speech regulations based on whether they regulate content is to 
prevent regulations that are motivated by animus towards certain 
disfavored speech.274 
In First Amendment jurisprudence, viewpoint discrimination is 
viewed as a subset of content-based speech regulation.275 Generally, 
the First Amendment forbids viewpoint discrimination; examples of 
this type of regulation involve government restrictions based on 
“disapproval of the ideas expressed,”276 or favoring certain speech 
over other speech.277 Viewpoint discrimination is also found when a 
financial burden is imposed on particular speakers based on the 
content of their speech.278  
4. Intermediate Scrutiny: The Most Appropriate Tier 
There are multiple ways a user could theoretically contest social 
media speech regulations. For instance, a user could seek to challenge 
specific restrictions placed on the content they post, or they could seek 
to challenge the overall policies that govern content on the 
platform.279 Looking at the Prager University case as an example, the 
                                                 
273.  Id. at 2222 (internal quotations omitted). 
274.  HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 240, at 1983 (citing Ashutosh Bhagwat, 
Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 362 (1997); 
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in 
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (arguing a main 
purpose of First Amendment law is to discover and prevent improper government 
motives)). 
275.  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) 
(reasoning that viewpoint discrimination is an egregious form of content 
discrimination). 
276.  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
277.  See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828. 
278.  Id. at 828–29 (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime 
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991)). 
279.  Future articles could expand on other legal challenges which might require 
the application of different tiers of scrutiny. 
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Plaintiff did not advocate for a particular level of scrutiny to be 
applied to the discriminatory practices of YouTube if the Court 
deemed YouTube to be a state actor. But looking at Prager’s 
allegations and those raised by other users, it appears the restrictions 
placed on their videos are the result of a content-based speech 
regulation regime. YouTube’s restricted mode feature makes certain 
videos unavailable to users who have restricted mode turned on, and 
those restrictions and categorizations are determined based on the 
content of the speech at issue.280 Thus, at least with respect to these 
allegations, and others like them, the regulation at issue would be 
deemed facially content-based because they target speech and subject 
it to restrictions based on its “communicative content.”281 Further, 
content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny, a principle 
recently clarified and emphasized by the majority in Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert.282 
However, intermediate scrutiny appears to be the most appropriate 
level of scrutiny to apply to social media speech regulations despite 
the fact that they would likely be content based restrictions 
traditionally subject to strict scrutiny. This is because, as private 
companies who face pressures to censor content, a more deferential 
approach should be given to their decisions to regulate content on their 
platforms.283  While this recommendation may contravene existing 
Supreme Court precedent under Reed, there is increasing support for 
the proposition that not every content-based speech restriction ought 
to be subject to strict scrutiny.284 
The concurrences in Reed advanced several arguments to support 
the notion that rigidly applying strict scrutiny to content-based 
restrictions does not always make sense.285 The reasoning from these 
concurrences strongly supports applying intermediate scrutiny to the 
content-based speech restrictions of social media companies. 
                                                 
280.  See Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
at 4, Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) No. 17-CV-06064-
LHK, 2018 BL 105688 (discussing the content regulation regime). 
281.  Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226. 
282.  See id. 
283.  See Jackson, supra note 22, at 142. 
284.  See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234 (Breyer, J. concurring); Nat'l Inst. of Family & 
Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 834 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part 
sub nom.; Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 464 (2017). 
285.  See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234–36 (Breyer, J. concurring). 
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In Reed, Justice Breyer’s concurrence opened by stating that the 
First Amendment required sensitivity to both expressive interests and 
the public’s legitimate need for sensible regulations.286 Content-based 
restrictions and the resulting strict scrutiny, he reasoned, ought to be 
“a rule of thumb” rather than automatic because strict scrutiny almost 
certainly leads to a regulation being struck down, however reasonable 
it is.287 He conceded that there are undoubtedly situations where it 
makes perfect sense to apply strict scrutiny to a content-based 
restriction; in several cases, the Supreme Court has discovered that 
certain content-based restrictions were used to suppress disfavored 
viewpoints. 288  He also affirmed the importance of preventing the 
government form disfavoring a particular point of view because it 
would inhibit the free exchange of ideas.289  
But he also pointed out that such an automatic trigger of strict 
scrutiny would hamstring the government’s ability to implement 
sensible regulations because such regulations almost always require 
content-based regulations.290 The essence of his opinion is that it is a 
much better approach to limit the application of the content based 
strict scrutiny framework to situations where there are instances of 
viewpoint discrimination or a traditional public forum is threatened, 
but in all other cases, the framework should be a “rule of thumb.”291 
The key question Breyer focuses on is whether the challenged 
regulation disproportionately harms First Amendment interests when 
compared to the objectives of the regulation. 292  To answer this 
question, he would consider “the seriousness of the harm to speech, 
the importance of the countervailing objectives, the extent to which 
the law will achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less 
restrictive ways of doing so.” 293  Justice Kagan joined by Justice 
Ginsburg echoed this point of view.294 Further, they also reasoned that 
the two primary reasons to apply strict scrutiny to content-based 
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regulations is to prevent viewpoint favoritism and preserve the 
marketplace of ideas.295 
Additionally, several circuits have expressed disfavor with rigidly 
applying strict scrutiny to all content-based speech restrictions.296 One 
such example is in cases where courts were faced with disputes about 
the appropriate amount of protection that “professional speech”297 
ought to be afforded.298 The cases from these circuits stand for the 
proposition that intermediate scrutiny applies to content-based 
restrictions in the context of professional speech. Some support this 
approach because it correctly balances the rights of professionals to 
speak with a state’s right to regulate the profession to advance the 
public interest.299 
The reasoning expressed in the Reed concurrences, along the 
rationales supporting the application of intermediate scrutiny to 
professional speech, support applying intermediate scrutiny to the 
speech regulations put in place by social media companies. Clearly, 
private social media companies are very different entities than a 
government. A fundamental aspect of a social media company’s 
business model is advertising revenue from the videos uploaded by 
users, and these companies have a strong interest in maintaining 
relationships with those advertisers.300 In addition, they are arguably 
entitled to additional deference because the initial decision to restrict 
content is often performed by an algorithm due to the voluminous 
amount of content that needs to be reviewed on a daily basis.301 
What complicates this analysis, however, is the fact that the 
allegations against YouTube and Facebook have centered around 
viewpoint discrimination.302 For example, Prager University contends 
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that the many of their videos are placed into restricted mode, but many 
other videos created by liberal users are not placed into restrictive 
mode.303 It is at this level that the rationales supporting the approaches 
in the Reed concurrences break down. Those concurring justices 
emphasized the prudence of flexibility when it comes to applying the 
First Amendment, but they couched those positions in concessions 
that strict scrutiny is especially appropriate when viewpoint 
discrimination is afoot. 304  Therefore, a Court should consider the 
flexibility that Justice Breyer advocated and depart from intermediate 
scrutiny if it is established that regulations are applied or created to 
discriminate based on viewpoint.305 
Finally, the benefits of applying intermediate scrutiny to content-
based restrictions on social media outweigh the costs. Although this 
tier of scrutiny has been criticized for its impact on stare decisis and 
promoting judicial activism, it is, at its core, a balancing test.306 In the 
context of social media platforms, it is essential to give due 
consideration to the reasons why these companies would restrict 
certain content. Intermediate scrutiny best strikes the appropriate 
balance between the importance of speech and the need for social 
media platforms to proactively manage content to further their 
legitimate business interests.307 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Social media companies have transformed the way in which we 
engage in the important conversations of our day.308 These companies 
are both influential and powerful and have signaled their desire to 
provide a platform for all ideas to be exchanged. But this ideal is not 
always achieved in practice. Social media companies have many good 
reasons to censor content which would not survive constitutional 
scrutiny. But censorship on these platforms, especially censorship that 
may involve political bias, should give us pause. This is especially 
true if legal recourse is unavailable due to the low likelihood that these 
companies will be deemed state actors. Regardless, this note has 
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argued that if the courts were to consider social media companies state 
actors, they ought to apply intermediate scrutiny because it strikes the 
best balance between expressive values and respect for the 
sovereignty of social media companies.309 Some may argue that those 
who allege censorship are free to join a different platform or create 
one of their own, but such a contention should also give us pause 
because of the likelihood that such a trend would further deepen the 
polarized state of our discourse.310 It is time to once again to rethink 
our state action jurisprudence, as Dean Chemerinsky argued, by 
asking ourselves “why infringements of the most basic values—
speech, privacy, and equality—should be tolerated just because the 
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